In a simple model where agents' monetary payoffs are uncertain, this paper studies the aggregation of uncertainty preferences which are ordinal and interpersonally noncomparable. A maximin social welfare criterion is derived from axioms of efficiency, equity, and social rationality, as well as separability of unconcerned agents and independence of risk preferences in riskless situations. The criterion compares allocations by the values of the prospects composed of the statewise minimum payoffs evaluated by the certainty equivalences.
Introduction
Which social welfare criterion should be adopted to evaluate public policies under uncertainty? In this paper, we address this question by investigating the implications of equity, efficiency, and social rationality, which are central principles to the welfare economics of risk and uncertainty. The path-breaking work is Harsanyi's (1955) aggregation theorem, which states that if individuals and the social planner are expected utility maximizers, the planner's utility function satisfying the standard ex ante Pareto principle 2 is represented by the weighted sum of individual expected utilities. The conditions of social expected utility and ex ante
Pareto are, respectively, considered as requirements of social rationality and efficiency.
Harsanyi's result revealed serious tensions between equity (ex ante or ex post), efficiency, and social rationality. Among others, Diamond (1967) insists that the social expected utility condition is not desirable, because it conflicts with ex ante equity in the sense of inequality aversion to the distribution of individual expected utilities. Moreover, Grant (1995) shows that any ex ante egalitarian criterion cannot be compatible the "minimal" social rationality, A main purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of equity, efficiency, and social rationality. The exploration is important to construct a reasonable social criterion. In particular, we consider efficiency conditions weaker than the ex ante Pareto principle, since it is broadly admitted that judgment under uncertainty is difficult for individuals because of heuristics and biases, and that it is not compelling to fully respect ex ante preferences (Hammond, 1981) . Another reason to weaken the ex ante Pareto condition is spurious unanimity pointed out by Mongin (1997) . If agents' beliefs are different, unanimous agreement on uncertain allocations may be spurious because of the disagreement of expectations for future outcomes. 3 In this paper, agents may not have probabilistic beliefs (as explained below), but we consider Pareto conditions which avoid the problem of spurious unanimity.
We also require independence of risk preferences in riskless situations (Chambers and Echenique, 2012) and separability of unconcerned agents at sure allocations. It is meaningful to restrict the application of separability to riskless allocations in the following respects.
First, an agent who has the same sure prospect in the allocations could be interpreted as a 2 The ex ante Pareto principle claims that if all agents prefer one allocation of prospects to the other, then the planner also prefers the former. This paper considers compatible five axioms in accordance with the above principles, which we refer to as the basic axioms. It is argued that the basic axioms have strong implications on inequality aversion. Though we just require a fairly weak equity condition, it is shown that the basic axioms imply Strong Dominance Aversion, which requires that if an agent's prospect strictly dominates the other's, this inequality should be reduced. In the main theorem, we characterize a maximin social welfare criterion by the axioms. The criterion assesses each allocation based on the prospect composed of the statewise minimum payoffs which is evaluated by the certainty equivalences. It is argued that this criterion is derived from a reasonable compromise between equity, efficiency, social rationality, and also separability of unconcerned individuals.
We adopt a simple economic model where agents' future monetary payoffs are uncertain. 4 It is not assumed that agents are expected utility maximizer or their preferences are interpersonally comparable, because these assumptions have been severely questioned. It is valuable to consider various preferences, since different individuals would follow different principles of decision-making under uncertainty and some of them may be probabilistically unsophisticated. We consider the aggregation of various ordinal preferences following the fair social ordering approach (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011) . Specifically, in this paper, certainty equivalence is derived as the measure to evaluate the prospect composed of the statewise minimum payoffs in each allocation.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2, the model is presented. In 4 An extension to the case of multi-dimensional outcomes is briefly discussed in the last section. section 3, the basic five axioms are introduced. In section 4, the implications of the basic axioms are analyzed. In section 5, we show our main theorem which characterizes the social criterion by the basic axioms. In section 6, concluding remarks are given.
The Model
Let N be the set of agents such that |N | ≥ 2. S = {s 1 , ..., s m } is the finite set of states with m ≥ 2. We denote f is ∈ R + the amount of money agent i receives under state s ∈ S.
An act of agent i is denoted by R i is agent i's preference relation over A, with strict part P i and indifference part I i . A binary relation is an quasi-ordering if it is reflexive and transitive. An ordering is a complete and transitive binary relation. We assume that R i is an ordering satisfying convexity, continuity, and monotonicity in the sense that
Convexity is considered as a condition of risk aversion (e.g., Yaari, 1969 ) and uncertainty aversion (e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Rigotti et al., 2008) . Let R denote the set of preferences satisfying the above conditions. 
Basic Axioms
In this section, we introduce basic five axioms. The first axiom is Statewise Dominance, which is often referred to as the minimal criterion for rational decision.
This axiom states that if every outcome of an allocation is weakly (resp. strictly) socially better than that of another allocation, the former allocation is socially weakly (resp. strictly) preferred to the latter. If the axiom is violated, the society may choose an allocation that results in a worse consequence.
Next, we introduce efficiency axioms. The first Pareto axiom takes into account ex post equality in the following form. In this paper, we say that f N is more ex post equal than f
and s ∈ S, and the strict inequality holds for some i, j ∈ N (i ̸ = j) and s ∈ S.
Consensual Pareto for Ex-post Equality. For all R N ∈ D such that R i = R j for all i, j ∈ N , and all f N ∈ X, x N ∈X such that f N is more ex post equal than x N , if
This axiom says that if all agents are willing to take risks (when f N is uncertain) and the outcomes are more equal than those before the risk-taking, then such preferences for risk-taking should be socially supported. When f N is also constant, the axiom is further compelling because all agents' monetary payoffs increase without any risk. This axiom is reasonable in terms of compatibility with ex post equality. Moreover, by the condition that all agents have the same preference, there is a consensus in the sense of Sprumont (2012) that everyone has a better prospect. This Pareto condition also avoids the problem of spurious unanimity (Mongin,1997), which is caused by different beliefs among agents.
Spurious unanimity is problematic when agents may obtain very different outcomes. It is not a problem for Consensual Pareto for Ex-post Equality because individuals have more equal outcomes under the uncertain allocation than under the constant allocation.
The next efficiency condition is introduced by .
When comparing uncertain allocations where all agents have the equal acts and thus are under the egalitarian condition, it is compelling to judge that the unanimously preferred allocation should be socially more desirable (Fleurbaey, 2010) 
This axiom requires that if there is an ex post inequality between two agents with the same preference, it should be socially accepted to reduce the inequality by transfers. The restriction to individuals with the same preference is meaningful in terms of equal treatment of equals.
The next invariance axiom was firstly introduced by Chambers and Echenique (2012).
Invariance to Risk Attitudes for Constant Acts (IRC). For all
This axiom claims that social judgements over constant allocations should be invariant of risk preferences. The idea is that as long as riskless outcomes are compared, agents' risk preferences are irrelevant for the comparisons. This axiom would also be reasonable in terms of a strategic viewpoint that social decisions over constant allocations should be robust to agents' misreports of their risk preferences.
The last axiom is a separability condition.
This axiom requires that an agent should not affect the evaluation of constant allocations if the agent has the same act in the allocations. As mentioned in the introduction, it is important to restrict the application of separability to riskless situations. 6 
Implications of the Basic Axioms
In this section, we derive implications of our basic axioms. Those implications are not only interesting in their own light, but also useful to prove our main theorem.
The first lemma says that Ex-post Transfer among Equals, Statewise Dominance, and
IRC together imply the following strong equity axiom.
Transfer. For all R N ∈ D and all
This axiom states that for two agents, if one has more income in every state than the other, a transfer in each state to reduce the inequality should be acceptable.
Lemma 1. Ex-post Transfer among Equals and Statewise Dominance together imply Trans-
fer. 6 The reader may notice that Separability for Sure Prospects is redundant for our results if |N | = 2.
This axiom is slightly weaker than the one employed by Fleurbaey and Zuber (2012) and Fleurbaey et al.
(2015), but we can obtain the same results using the stronger separability condition. 
Lemma 3. The basic five axioms together imply Strong Ex-post Inequality Aversion.
Proof. Since x N and x ′ N are constant allocations, we can invoke IRC to arbitrarily modify the preferences. Then, suppose that all agents have R 0 defined as follows: For a probability distribution π over S and sufficiently small ϵ > 0 (as explained below),
First, we consider y N , y As a direct implication of Lemma 3, we obtain the following strong equity condition, which states that inequality of prospects between two agents should be reduced.
The proof is straightforward. By assumption, f
The following lemma is useful to prove our main theorem. For each f N ∈ X, we denote m(f N ) = (min i∈N f is ) s∈S ∈ A, which is the prospect composed of the statewise minimum payoffs in f N .
Lemma 4.
Suppose that R satisfies the basic five axioms. Then, for all R N ∈ D and all
For our purpose, it is sufficient to show
The rest of the proof is divided into two cases. 
The Social Criterion
In this section, we derive the social welfare criterion from the basic axioms. For convenience, we introduce a notation. Given f i ∈ A and R i ∈ R, let
which is the certainty equivalence of f i with respect to R i .
Then, we obtain the following result.
Theorem. Suppose that an SQF R satisfies the basic five axioms. Then, for all R N ∈ D and all f N , f
The 
. Consider
By Lemma 4, we have f N P (R N )g N and g
Then, by transitivity, we have the desired result.
Consider x N , y N ∈X such that 
However, this criterion violates Separability for Sure Prospects. To fully characterize R M , we can use the standard continuity condition and the following weaker separability.
Well-off Separability for Sure Prospects.
This axiom says that when evaluating constant allocations, an unconcerned individual cannot affect the evaluation as long as the agent has larger monetary payoffs than the worst-offs. In terms of egalitarian view, the information on the worst-offs is important and the social evaluation may well change if the situations of the worst-offs vary. This axiom captures the idea and restricts the separability principle to the case where the unconcerned agent is not the worst-off. It is straightforward to modify the analysis. One can restate Lemma 3 so that agent k is the worst-off in both x N and x ′ N and apply the above separability instead of Separability for Sure Prospect. The modification of the proof of Theorem is a little tedious but straightforward. Note that we consider an SQF satisfying the basic axioms.
Completeness is obtained as a result of the characterization.
The basic axioms are satisfied by a leximin criterion similar to R M . To introduce the leximin criterion, we introduce several notations. Given f N ∈ X and s ∈ S, f (i)s is the ith lowest payoff of f N in s. 7 Let us denote m (i) (f N ) = (f (i)s ) s∈S , which is the prospect composed of the ith lowest monetary payoffs in f N .
Definition. R LM is a social ordering function such that for all R N ∈ D and all f N , f
where ≥ lex the standard lexicographic ordering. It remains for future research to fully characterize R LM .
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyzed the implications of equity, efficiency and social rationality under uncertainty. We obtained the social criterion which is sensitive to the statewise worst-off individuals. In the literature of welfare economics under risk and uncertainty, it is an important issue to construct a social welfare criterion satisfying separability and the three principles above (Fleurbaey, 2010; Fleurbaey and Zuber, 2013; . Our result provided an answer to the problem.
To make our analysis simple, we considered the model where each agent's ex post wellbeing is measured in monetary terms and thus single dimensional. The analysis can be extended to the case where agents have preferences over multidimensional outcomes, following the approach developed by . In that case, a criterion for interpersonal comparison is adopted to evaluate agents' well-beings ex post using the fair social ordering approach (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011 ).
7 Ties can be broken arbitrarily.
